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COn~tit~tiOnal Law-STANDING-U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS 
No NONSTATUTORY STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT-United States u. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. 
Md. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976). 
The United States Attorney General brought suit for the 
United States (the government) against Maryland officials to en- 
join certain practices and policies in the administration of the 
state's program of care and training for the institutionalized men- 
tally retarded. The government claimed that these practices and 
policies resulted in widespread deprivation of rights guaranteed 
to the hospital's residents by the eighth, thirteenth, and four- 
teenth amendments.' 
The Maryland officials moved to dismiss, contending that 
the Attorney General had no standing to initiate the suit. The 
United States claimed statutory authority to sue under 28 U.S.C. 
sections 516 and 518,2 under the "take Care" clause of the Consti- 
t ~ t i o n , ~  and under a nonstatutory governmental right to sue aris- 
ing when state actions result in widespread deprivation of consti- 
tutional rights.' The United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland held that without a specific statutory grant of au- 
thority the Attorney General's power did not rise to the bringing 
of a suit on behalf of the United States under the fourteenth 
amendment. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was 
granted. 
A. Statutory Authority 
In 1870, Congress enacted a law creating the Department of 
J u ~ t i c e . ~  Section 5 of this act included the basic language cur- 
l. The United States alleged cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth 
amendment, involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment, and depri- 
vation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 
32-33, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 
76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976). 
2. 28 U.S.C. $ 4  516, 518 (1970). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, $ 3: "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . ." 
4. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra. 
5. Department of Justice Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (current version in scat- 
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
The office of Attorney General had previously been established by Congress. On 
September 24, 1789 a bill was passed by Congress in which provision was made for the 
4741 CASE NOTES 475 
rently embodied in 28 U.S.C. sections 516 and 518(b). These sec- 
tions provide that the Attorney General shall direct litigation in 
which the United States is "a party, or is interested," and that 
when the United States is "interested," the Attorney General 
may conduct any case in federal court when he "considers it in 
the interests of the United  state^."^ 
Clearly, sections 516 and 518(b) provide the Attorney Gen- 
eral with both the authority and the responsibility to protect the 
interests of the United States in suits in which the United States 
is a defendant. While the Attorney General's access to the courts 
is not so apparent when he seeks to initiate suits as a plaintiff to 
protect alleged government interests, it seems clear, nonetheless, 
that when there is actually a legitimate interest of the United 
States that needs protection, sections 516 and 518(b) authorize 
the Attorney General to sue.' 
The statutory language can be interpreted as a simple decla- 
ration that when the United States has a legitimate interest to 
protect (as defined by statute or traditional standing require- 
ments) the Attorney General shall be the United States' repre- 
sentative in court. The language may also be interpreted as a 
more comprehensive declaration that the Attorney General is 
himself vested with the power to determine when the United 
appointment of an Attorney General "whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all 
suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give 
advice" to the President and heads of departments of the national government. Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, $ 35, 1 Stat. 73 (current version in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
6. 28 U.S.C. $ 516 (1970): 
[Elxcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which 
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and 
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney General. 
28 U.S.C. $ 518(b) (1970): 
[Wlhen the Attorney General considers it in the interests of the United 
States, he may personally conduct and argue any case in a court of the United 
States in which the United States is interested, or he may direct the Solicitor 
General or an officer of the Department of Justice to do so. 
In the instant case, the Attorney General contended that in $ 4  516 and 518(b) Con- 
gress has given the executive broad powers to sue to protect the interests of the United 
States. See Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss a t  4-5, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), appeal 
docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976). 
7. The Supreme Court has viewed the predecessors of $ 0  516 and 518 as giving the 
Attorney General authority to protect government interests. Speaking of the statutes, the 
Court said: "[Nlo Act of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the Attor- 
ney General the authority and duty to protect the Government's interests through the 
courts." United States v. California, 332 US.  19, 27-28 (1947). 
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States has such an interest to p r ~ t e c t . ~  The former interpretation 
gives the Attorney General authority to conduct litigation for the 
United States provided that the government has a demonstrable 
interest to protect that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
  tan ding.^ The latter interpretation gives the Attorney General 
the  authority to determine when the  United Sta tes  is 
"interested" and in effect allows the Attorney General to deter- 
mine his own standing. 
Specific statutory standing has been given the Attorney Gen- 
eral in certain limited areas.1° There is, however, no comprehen- 
sive description embodied in statute that identifies the requisite 
interest which allows the Attorney General to sue. Thus, it is 
necessary to examine case law to determine when and why the 
Attorney General has been given authority to sue in the absence 
of a statutory grant. 
B. Nonstatutory Right to Sue 
The first judicially created authority for the Attorney Gen- 
eral to sue arose in cases involving his right to bring suit to protect 
the proprietary and contractual interests of the United States? 
- 
8. This expanded interpretation was rejected by one federal district court that said 
that § 516 "does not explicitly provide that officers of the Department of Justice may 
conduct any litigation in which they believe the government has any interest; it merely 
provides that if any is conducted, it shall be done by the Department of Justice." United 
States v. Daniel, Urbahn, Seelye, & Fuller, 357 F. Supp. 853, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
A similar expanded interpretation, however, was applied in People ex rel. Woll v. 
Graber, 394 Ill. 362,68 N.E.2d 750 (l946), in applying what is now 28 U.S.C. 9 517 (1970). 
Section 517 states the following: 
The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be 
sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to 
attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the 
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the 
United States. 
The court in Graber stated: 
While the Attorney General may not maintain an action solely for the 
vindication of private rights or redress of private grievances in which the public 
has no interest and may not appear in any litigation upon behalf of a defendant 
except for the interests of the United States, we think it must be conceded that 
the above section authorizes the Attorney General to direct the appearance of a 
United States Attorney in any civil suit between private persons in which the 
interests of the United States are involved and vests the Attorney General with 
discretionary power to determine when the interests of the United States are 
actually involved in the litigation and require attention and protection. 
394 Ill. at 370, 68 N.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added). 
9. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text infra. 
10. See, e.g., note 49 infra. 
11. See Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818). In explaining why 
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Later, government access to the courts was allowed when the 
Attorney General sought to set aside a land patent obtained from 
the government by fraud. ''[Vhat the United States should not 
be more helpless in relieving itself from frauds, impostures, and 
deceptions than the private individual," reasoned the Supreme 
Court, "is hardly open to argument."12 In United States u. Ameri- 
can Bell Telephone,13 this rule was extended to give the govern- 
ment standing to protect itself against fraud in the obtaining of 
patents for inventions. 
The language of the Court in Bell Telephone marked an ex- 
pansion of the Attorney General's nonstatutory right to sue, since 
the Court emphasized the right of the government to sue to pre- 
vent a "grievous wrong upon the general public" rather than its 
right to protect the government's proprietary and contractual in- 
terests.Vhus, the Court began to show a willingness to allow the 
Attorney General standing to sue to protect not only the rights 
of the government as an entity but the rights of large groups of 
private citizens. 
In re Debs15 was the next major extension of the Attorney 
General's nonstatutory power to sue." Debs involved a govern- 
ment suit to enjoin union activities that obstructed interstate 
commerce during the Pullman strike of 1894. Although the Court 
could have granted the Attorney General authorization to sue 
the United States could sue to protect its interests the court said: "In all cases of contract 
with the United States, they must have a right to enforce the performance of such con- 
tract, or to recover damages for their violation . . . . It would be strange to deny to them 
a right which is secured to every citizen of the United States." Id. at 181 (emphasis 
added). See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); Kern River Co. v. United States, 
257 U.S. 147 (1921); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1851); United 
States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 114 (1831). 
12. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888). 
13. 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
14. Id. at 357-58: 
[I]t will be observed that this broad assertion [that the Attorney General has 
no standing] admits that a party may practice an intentional fraud upon the 
officers of the government . . . and that he may by means of that fraud perpe- 
trate a grievous wrong upon the general public . . . . [Vhe argument asserts 
that the practice of a gross fraud upon the United States, concerning matters 
of immense pecuniary value, and affecting a very large part of its population, is 
not a proper question of judicial cognizance. It would be a strange anomaly in a 
government . . . to hold that . . . there should be no remedy for such a wrong. 
15. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
16. Debs itself has served as precedent for further expansions of governmental stand- 
ing. See, e.g., United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1964). But see 
United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd sub 
nom. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 929 (1964). See generally 84 HARv. L. REV. 1930, 1930-34 (1971). 
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because of the government's proprietary interest in the mails,17 a 
much broader basis of standing was declared: 
We do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone 
[i.e., proprietary interest in the mails] . . . . The obligations 
which [the government] is under to promote the interest of all, 
and to prevent the wrongdoing of one, resulting in injury to the 
general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing 
in the court. . . . 
. . .  
. . . [Wlhenever the wrongs complained of are such as 
affect the public a t  large, and are in respect of matters which 
by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and 
concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of 
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that 
the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is 
not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from 
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional 
duties.I8 
Relying on this broad language, courts have upheld the At- 
torney General when he has brought actions to protect alleged 
government interests. Thus, it  has been generally recognized that 
the Attorney General has nonstatutory standing to maintain ac- 
tions to relieve widespread burdens on interstate commerce,lg to 
remove obstructions to navigable waters within the boundaries of 
the United States,20 to protect the government's policies concern- 
ing national defense," to enforce conditions of federal grants,22 
17. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845) (holding that the mails are 
property of the United States while in transit). 
18. 158 U.S. at 584-86. 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
20. In Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), the United States sued 
to enjoin an agency of Illinois from continuing practices that resulted in the lowering of 
the water level of Lake Michigan thereby obstructing commerce. The United States Su- 
preme Court stated: 
The United States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce and to 
control the navigable waters within its jurisdiction. It has a standing in this suit 
not only to remove obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce . . . but also 
to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power bordering upon some of the 
Lakes concerned, and, it may be, also on the footing of an ultimate sovereign 
interest in the Lakes. The Attorney General by virtue of his office may bring 
this proceeding and no statute is necessary to authorize this suit. 
Id. at 425-26. 
21. In United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929, 923-33 (4th Cir. 1964), the 
court held that the government had a nonstatutory right to sue to protect members of the 
naval forces from being subjected to state personal property tax in violation of the Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940. Accord, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969). 
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and to enjoin deprivation of civil rights if there is an accompany- 
ing burden on interstate commerce.23 Although basing their hold- 
ings on other grounds, some courts have suggested that the Attor- 
ney General has "authority to sue to remedy widespread and 
severe deprivations of constitutional rights."24 
The 1970 federal district court case of United States v. Brand 
Jewelers, Inc.25 marked the broadest judicial interpretation to 
date of the Attorney General's nonstatutory right to sue. In Brand 
the Attorney General sued to enjoin a systematic practice of 
"sewer" service of process that resulted in numerous default judg- 
ments and subsequent garnishments of wages against ghetto 
dwellers." The court held that the Attorney General had standing 
to sue due to the alleged burden on interstate commerce caused 
by the large-scale garnishment of wages." The court also held 
22. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (M.D. Ala. 1970): 
Aside from the contractual aspects of the relationship between the United 
States and the State of Alabama concerning these grants, there is no necessity 
for specific statutory authority in order to permit the United States to bring this 
action. . . . [a t  has been determined upon numerous occasions by the courts 
of our land that the Attorney General may sue on behalf of the United States 
by virtue of his office if the United States has an interest to protect. 28 U.S.C. 
0 0  516-519. 
23. United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. La. 1962), aff'd per 
curiam, 316 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. 
La.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 10 (1962). 
24. Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152,157 (D.S.C. 1974); accord, United States v. City 
of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 14-17 (5th Cir. 1963). 
25. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For analyses of Brand, see Note, Nonstatutory 
Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HAW. L. REV. 1566 (1972); 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
426 (1971); 84 HARV. L. REV. 1930 (1971); 24 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1971); 17 WAYNE L. REV. 
1287 (1971); 1971 WIS. L. REV. 665. 
26. The defendants in Brand had developed a system whereby merchandise was sold 
to ghetto dwellers on easy terms. When the buyers failed to keep up the payments, process 
servers prepared affidavits evidencing service of process without ever having delivered the 
documents to the person to be served. Default judgments were entered and subsequently 
the ghetto dwellers' wages were garnished to pay the debt; the garnishment of wages was 
usually the first notice that these alleged debtors received. The Attorney General not only 
sought an injunction against the participating companies and process servers, but also 
sought damages for deprivation of property without due process of law. 318 F. Supp. a t  
1294. 
27. Congressional findings show that commerce might be obstructed as a result of 
garnishment practices since they often result in loss of employment for the debtor that in 
turn results in disruption of employment, production, etc. Consumer Credit Protection 
Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. 8 1671(a)(2) (1970). 
The trend has been to relax the requirement of a burden on interstate commerce. In 
Debs, decided in 1895, the burden on commerce was nationwide and the emergency nature 
of the situation required executive intervention through court action. In Brand, decided 
in 1970, the Attorney General was considered to have standing when the only link with 
interstate commerce was whatever burden on interstate commerce might arise from the 
480 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
that the United States "has standing to sue to end widespread 
deprivations (i. e . ,  deprivations affecting many people) of prop- 
erty through 'state action' without due process of law."28 This 
latter holding apparently constituted an extension that allowed 
the Attorney General to protect citizens' fourteenth amendment 
rights independent of interstate commerce  consideration^.^" 
The cases, then, demonstrate that the government's interest 
in interstate commerce has often given the Attorney General 
standing in the courts when mainly individual constitutional 
rights were being enforced.30 Some of those cases could be inter- 
preted as granting the Attorney General standing to vindicate 
constitutional rights independent of interstate commerce consid- 
erations. Alternative grounds of statutory authority or, following 
Debs, burdening interstate commerce existed, however, in every 
case. 
In Solomon the court began from the premise that the execu- 
tive has no power unless it can be found in express congressional 
authorization or explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. The 
court noted that sections 516 and 518 
tell us nothing about the nature of "interest" which will activate 
the Attorney General's discretion to act. These sections, there- 
fore, constitute no authority on which to base a conclusion that 
Congress has explicitly authorized the executive to bring suits 
generally under the thirteenth and fourteenth arnendrnent~.~' 
Similarly, the court, noting that "the executive's burden of show- 
ing the need for an independent authority to act is most severe" 
in areas of protection of fourteenth amendment rights and devel- 
opment of interstate commerce policy, stated that the "take 
Care" clause was an insufficient rationale to justify allowing the 
Attorney General to maintain the action.32 
garnishment of wages. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)znited 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 112-24 (1941). 
28. 318 F. Supp. at 1299. 
29. Traditionally, only natural persons have been allowed to sue to protect fourteenth 
amendment rights. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). Some courts have held that 
the United States is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and 
is therefore unable to sue to protect fourteenth amendment rights. United States v. Biloxi 
Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 
326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964). 
30. See cases cited in notes 24-25 supra. 
31. 419 F. Supp. at 362-63 (emphasis added). 
32. Id. at 372. The Constitution directs that the President shall take an oath to 
CASE NOTES 
After tracing the development of nonstatutory standing of 
the Attorney General to its farthest reaches in the interstate com- 
merce context33 as represented by Debs and Brand, the court 
noted that "[tlhe extension of the Debs principle toward the 
outer limits of the definition of 'burdens' on interstate commerce 
works a subtle reorganization of the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches of the federal g~vernment."~~ 
Furthermore, such an extension would upset the system of feder- 
alism in that it would expose nearly all state policies and pro- 
grams to executive attack.35 The court stated that the same prin- 
ciples of balance of powers and federalism "which militate 
against extending Debs to the limits of the notion of burdens on 
interstate commerce also dictate against . . . [extension of the 
Debs principle] into the area of thirteenth or fourteenth amend- 
ment enf~rcement."~~ The court also pointed out that Congress 
has specifically considered giving the Attorney General broad 
powers to sue under the fourteenth amendment and has rejected 
"preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. 
11, § 1, cl. 7, and that he "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. 5 3. 
The Attorney General can be considered "the hand of the President in taking care that 
the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the United States . . . be 
faithfully executed." Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). Such reasoning could 
be used to argue that the Attorney General therefore has authority to bring suit to "take 
Care" that constitutional rights not be violated. 
There is no question that Congress may give the Attorney General the power to 
enforce laws by criminal prosecution or civil suit. United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 
a t  362. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,27 (1960). Absent statutory author- 
ity, however, it is not clear that the Attorney General may sue civilly to enforce the 
constitutional rights of others. In relation to private parties seeking standing, the courts 
have frequently stated that "one may not claim standing . . . to vindicate the constitu- 
tional rights of some third party." See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
The courts have generally applied a narrow interpretation of the "take Care" clause. 
The court in the instant case declared that the clause is "subject to . . . circumspection." 
419 F. Supp. at 372. Justice Frankfurter has expressed a similar view. Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
33. The executive's nonstatutory standing to sue under the commerce clause is well 
established. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Florida E. 
Coast Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682,685 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd sub ;tom. Brotherhood 
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 US.  238 (1966); United States v. City 
of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F. Supp. 
36 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La.), aff'd per 
curium, 371 U.S. 10 (1962); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590, 594 
(M.D. Ala. 1962); United States v. United States Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 
Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 902 (M.D. Ala. 1961). 
34. 419 F. Supp. at 366. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 367. 
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all such  proposal^,^' whereas Congress was silent as to the Attor- 
ney General's standing in the interstate commerce area.38 
Thus, the court "respectfully decline[d]" to follow Brand's 
"'imaginative unfolding' of the Debs principle into the 'area of 
fourteenth amendment enf~rcement"~~ and dismissed the Attor- 
ney General's suit. 
The instant case is distinguishable from other cases concern- 
ing the Attorney General's standing because it did not contain 
recognized alternative grounds on which to base such standing. 
Here the Attorney General did not sue under any statute, nor did 
he sue to remove burdens from interstate commerce or to protect 
proprietary, contractual, or national defense interests. Rather, he 
claimed standing to sue directly and solely under the fourteenth 
amendment. Thus, an analysis of the issues in the instant case 
requires more than reliance on and citation of prior case law. 
This analysis will first discuss the applicability of balance of 
powers40 and federalism principles to the instant case and to the 
fourteenth amendment context and demonstrate how these prin- 
ciples should operate to deny nonstatutory standing to the Attor- 
ney General. Second, the analysis will show that traditional 
standing criteria could have been applied by the court to reach 
the same result. 
37. Title 111 of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1957 would have empowered the 
Attorney General to initiate civil actions for injunctive relief to protect fourteenth amend- 
ment rights. This portion of the Act, however, failed to pass. 103 CONG. REC. 12, 530-65 
(1957). A later attempt in 1964 also failed. H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 
22, 81-83, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2392, 2397-98, 2450- 
52. The legislative history reveals that Congress rejected these proposals because they 
would have placed too much power in the hands of the Attorney General and would have 
improperly interjected the Department of Justice into certain areas of litigation. H.R. REP. 
No. 914,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 
2450. 
38. The court further distinguished Debs by saying: 
It  is one thing to give the executive an independent role when there is an 
emergency threat to interstate commerce to which only the executive branch of 
government has the capacity to respond with appropriate alacrity, but is quite 
another thing to give the executive an independent role where the "emergency" 
is debatable and all that may be a t  stake is the development of policy concerning 
interstate commerce. The commerce clause clearly anticipated that policy de- 
velopment is to be left to Congress. 
419 F. Supp. at 366. 
39. Id. at  368. 
40. For a general treatment of the balance of powers concept, see A. VANDERBILT, HE 
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953). 
CASE NOTES 
A. Constitutional and Policy Considerations41 
Liberal grants of standing to the Attorney General in the 
interstate commerce context have shifted some constitutional 
power in this area away from Congress. The court in the instant 
case refused to follow suit in the context of the fourteenth amend- 
ment. The court, analyzing the effects of the government's 
claimed right to sue on the balance of powers between the execu- 
tive and the legislative branches, stated that the same considera- 
tions that dictate against extending the government's standing in 
the interstate commerce context also militate against granting 
standing to the Attorney General when suing under the four- 
teenth amendment." In effect, the court acknowledged that non- 
statutory standing has been improperly granted in marginal in- 
terstate commerce contexts, and refused to extend nonstatutory 
standing to the fourteenth amendment context. The court's anal- 
ysis emphasizes the similarities in considerations governing the 
Attorney. General's standing in interstate commerce cases and in 
fourteenth amendment cases. The court could have been much 
more persuasive, however, by illustrating the differences between 
these two classes of cases, thereby demonstrating that the Attor- 
ney General arguably should have standing in the interstate com- 
merce context but not in the fourteenth amendment context. 
- 
41. When dealing with policy considerations, a weighing process inevitably takes 
place in order for a decision to be made. Hence, to conclude that a certain action would 
adversely affect the balance of powers in the national government is not dispositive of the 
issue. Arguably, the government is flexible enough to tolerate some degree of imbalance 
in the power structure. The issue in the instant case is whether the sacrifice in the balance 
of powers is worth the good that might accrue by allowing the Attorney General to sue on 
the behalf of the mentally retarded. 
42. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. It is not clear, however, that such is 
the case. The commerce clause is contained in the main body of the Constitution which 
distinguishes between the powers of the several branches of the national government. That 
portion of the Constitution was meant to establish and separate the powers of the three 
branches of the federal government. There is no doubt that the commerce clause was 
meant to give Congress, not the executive, the power to regulate commerce. Since Con- 
gress is given such plenary power concerning interstate commerce, any independent action 
on the part of the executive to regulate interstate commerce could be classified as an 
encroachment on the legislative power. 
The fourteenth amendment, however, may not be subject to the same balance-of- 
powers analysis because it is an amendment and is not found within the constitutional 
articles that separate the powers of the governmental branches. Nevertheless, 6 5 of the 
amendment states that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article." This may indicate that enforcement of fourteenth amend- 
ment rights is given to Congress rather than to the executive or judiciary. But see Memo- 
randum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 18-22, 
United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976). 
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When commerce is significantly burdened, the economy of 
the United States arguably is injured. It follows, then, that the 
Attorney General represents the real party in interest, the United 
States, when he sues under the nonstatutory burden-on- 
commerce theory. In contrast, it can be persuasively argued that 
the fourteenth amendment was not meant to give the government 
a right that it could protecc rather, it was meant to endow citi- 
zens with power to enforce rights against the states. When consti- 
tutional rights are violated the real party in interest is the person 
who has suffered the injury. Moreover, there is no need for the 
Attorney General to sue to protect the rights of individuals who, 
under the fourteenth amendment, are given the opportunity to 
protect their own rights. Indeed, some courts have held that in 
the absence of congressional authorization, the Attorney General 
cannot enforce the constitutional rights of  individual^.^^ 
The issue of balance of powers between Congress and the 
Attorney General also exists because of the language of the four- 
teenth amendment. Section 5 of the amendment gives Congress 
"the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article." This language apparently means that Congress 
has the power to specify how fourteenth amendment rights are to 
be en f~ rced .~~  In fact, Congress has so specified by enacting var- 
ious civil rights  provision^.^^ By "appropriate legislation," Con- 
gress has thus defined the circumstances under which the Attor- 
ney General may prosecute, intervene, or sue to protect constitu- 
tional rights. Since Congress has exercised the power to define in 
whose favor and under what circumstances an action will lie for 
violation of constitutional rights, it is an encroachment on that 
power to endow the executive branch with a nonstatutory power 
to sue under the fourteenth amendment.46 
43. See, e.g., United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 
(S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 
237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 
400 F. Supp. 1122, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 
(1943); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D. Minn. 1969); Krum v. 
Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994, 997 (W.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 407 F.2d 49 
(6th Cir. 1967). 
44. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
45. See note 50 infra. In addition, individuals may sue directly under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
46. The court implied that to allow the Attorney General to sue in the instant case 
would allow the executive branch to encroach on the power of Congress by exercising an 
independent role in making law and policy. See 419 F. Supp. at 366. This position relies 
on the assumption that the Attorney General by suing is directly or unilaterally making 
law or policy. No executive order is being issued; no law is being declared. The Attorney 
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Another important constitutional question arising from the 
instant case-and one not discussed by the court-concerns fed- 
eralism policies.47 The question is whether the fourteenth amend- 
ment should be enforced against the states by the Attorney Gen- 
eral, or whether it should be enforced by providing individuals 
with a cause of action against states that violate their rights. 
Since state action depriving individuals of constitutional rights 
is intolerable under the Constitution, unilateral executive action 
would arguably be justifiable to enjoin such state action.48 If, 
however, the executive were granted standing under the four- 
teenth amendment, the litigation would inevitably be directed a t  
state officials, thereby increasing the tension between national 
and state governments and dealing a serious blow to federalism. 
General is merely suing in the courts to enforce a law proposed by Congress and ratified 
by the states. 
Any law or policy that might be developed by allowing the Attorney General to sue 
would be ma.de jointly by the executive and judicial branches. This is not meant to suggest 
that a majority rules among the branches of the federal government. One branch should 
not be able to augment its powers or upset the balance of powers by simply gaining the 
approval of another branch; our system of government recognizes that each branch can 
operate as a check on any other branch. Nevertheless, it is possible that the executive and 
judicial branches combined can do what the executive alone cannot. Such was the case 
when the executive was granted standing to sue to remedy burdens on interstate com- 
merce. Of course Congress could legislate to negate such executive and judiciary action, 
and thus operate as a check on the combined efforts of those branches. The fact that such 
legislation has not been enacted supports at least a possible inference that Congress 
approved of giving the executive such standing. As the court in Solomon properly notes, 
this inference is not particularly strong: 
Action by Congress is usually time-consuming and quite arduous. To place a 
burden of response on the legislative process would undoubtedly result in the 
development of ambiguous policy situations in which, for whatever reasons, the 
legislature has been unable to grind out either an explicit approval or disap- 
proval of the policy brought into being by an executive lawsuit. 
Id. To grant standing to the executive to sue in the fourteenth amendment context and 
let Congress decide whether to legislate otherwise may not be a satisfactory approach. See 
Note, Nonstatutory Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HAW. L. REV. 1566, 1574-75 
(1972). 
47. The resolution of the balance of powers question bears heavily on the considera- 
tion of federalism. Indeed, it seems impossible in the present context to completely sepa- 
rate the two. If it were decided, for instance, that the executive has nonstatutory power 
under the fourteenth amendment to sue the states for alleged violations of citizens' rights, 
a direct confrontation of federal and state power comes into play. If, on the other hand, 
the executive were allowed to sue the states for violation of fourteenth amendment rights 
pursuant only to congressional authorization, a softening influence is imposed between 
executive power and states' rights. 
48. Executive court action helped to remedy the widespread discrimination prevalent 
in the South during the early 1960's. Such action in the courts might also expedite the 
process of securing to the mentally retarded their rights. Discussion of the extent of the 
rights of the mentally retarded and the application of constitutional rights to the institu- 
tionalized, however; is beyond the scope of this case note. 
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Allowing individuals to enforce their own rights against the states 
through the Constitution, on the other hand, does little if any 
harm to federalism policies. 
Neither federal nor individual action is the exclusive method 
of enforcing the fourteenth amendment. Congress has established 
a blend of federal and individual enforcement of fourteenth 
amendment rights.4v That blend has been altered from time to 
time to meet current problems in our society.50 
The challenge of striking an acceptable balance between fed- 
eral and state powers while at the same time adjusting the bal- 
ance between federal and individual enforcement of constitu- 
tional rights to meet current needs is a task that can best be 
performed by the national legislature. Of the three branches of 
the federal government, Congress, through its representatives 
49. In establishing the scheme of enforcement of constitutional rights, Congress has 
given broad powers to individuals whose rights have been violated to bring suit to enforce 
those rights. See 42 U.S.C. $$ 1983, 1985 (1970). On the other hand, Congress has been 
careful to limit the power of the Attorney General to enforce such rights. The Attorney 
General may bring civil suit only in the areas of voting rights, 42 U.S.C. Q 1971(c) (1970); 
public accomodation, 42 U.S.C. §Q 2000a-3, 2000a-5 (1970); public facilities, 42 U.S.C. Q 
2000b (1970); school desegregation, 42 U.S.C. Q 2000~-6 (1970); and housing, 42 U.S.C. Q 
3613 (19?0). Even in these areas the Attorney General's powers are limited. For example, 
in actions under fi 2000c the Attorney General must receive a meritorious complaint from 
the victim of discrimination and certify that the person is unable to "initiate and maintain 
appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially 
further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education . . . ." 42 U.S.C. Q 
2000~-6(a) (1970). 
Under 18 U.S.C. $8 241-242 (1970), the Attorney General may prosecute for conspir- 
acy against the rights of citizens or deprivation of rights under color of law. Section 242 
states: "[wlhoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States . . . shall be fined . . . ." If the Attorney General can prosecute when 
a party deprives another of constitutional rights under color of law, it seems logical that 
he should be able to sue civilly to enjoin a party from such actions. An analogous line of 
reasoning was applied in In re Debs, 158 US. 564 (1895). There the Court reasoned that 
if the executive could have called out the military to remedy the burden on interstate 
commerce caused by the Pullman Strike of 1894, it would be anomalous to block the 
executive's effort to solve peacefully the problem by suing for an injunction in the courts. 
It appears, however, that to apply this reasoning in the fourteenth amendment context 
would establish a different standard of proof than was intended by §§ 241 and 242. 
Because $9 241 and 242 are criminal statutes, convictions would have to be based on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the executive were allowed standing to sue civilly, the 
standard applied to civil suits (proof by a preponderance of the evidence) would allow the 
Attorney General to accomplish enforcement of constitutional rights in situations where 
it formerly was not possible. 
50. For example, the Attorney General was given temporary powers to sue under 42 
U.S.C. Q 2000e-6 (Supp. V 1975) to expedite the securing of employment rights to minori- 
ties. 
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from every state, can be most sensitive to the effect that expan- 
sion of government powers in the area of fourteenth amendment 
enforcement would have on the federal system. It seems fitting, 
therefore, that Congress should continue to strike that balance 
between individual and federal enforcement through statutory 
enactments. For the courts to allow the Attorney General to en- 
force constitutional rights against the states without statutory 
authorization, especially in the face of congressional disap- 
pr0va1,~l would not only smack of judicial legislation but would 
impair Congress' ability to balance federalism considerations. 
B. Standing 
Although the issue presented to the court by the defendants' 
motion to dismiss was primarily a question of standing, the court 
in reaching its decision placed little emphasis on elements of 
standing. The main thrust of the opinion concerns federalism and 
balance of powers arguments. Although, as will be shown below, 
the cou* reached a sound result as to the standing issue, it would 
have been more persuasive had the court utilized the established 
criteria of standing52 in reaching its decision. 
The question of standing involves both constitutional and 
prudential limitationsJ3 on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 
The constitutional limitation consists of meeting the "threshold 
question" in every case by determining if the plaintiff has made 
out a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III? In 
its constitutional sense, standing is a question of whether the 
51. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
52. Admittedly, the law of standing is in a state of confusion. See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490 (1975) (compare Justice Brennan's dissent with Justice Powell's majority 
opinion); Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974); 
see generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATE- ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 1547-81 (9th ed. 
1975). The confusion is further complicated by recent decisions concerning the criteria 
applied to determine standing. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); 42 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 390, 407 (1975). In addition, it is not clear that the standing tests 
enumerated in the leading cases apply to all types of plaintiffs. For example, in Warth 
the Court held that "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must 
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, 
and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' intervention." 422 
US. 490,508 (1975) (emphasis added). This test may not apply to all plaintiffs. Neverthe- 
less, an examination of the case law reveals that certain tests of standing recur. 
53. In addition to constitutional limitations, the courts have imposed limitations on 
federal jurisdiction as a matter of judicial self-governance. These latter are called pruden- 
tial limitations. 
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
, 
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plaintiff has alleged a personal stake in the controversy sufficient 
to assure the "concrete adverseness" upon which courts depend 
for "illumination of difficult constitutional  question^."^^ Further- 
more, plaintiffs in federal courts must allege some "threatkned or 
actual injury" before a court may obtain jurisdi~tion.~~ Congress, 
of course, cannot abrogate the constitutional standing require- 
ments derived from Article '111. 
Unlike the constitutional limitations, the judicially imposed 
prudential limitations can be abrogated by statute.57 Significant 
prudential requirements of standing include the need for the ac- 
tual injury to be a particularized injury rather than a 
"generalized gr ievan~e ."~~ Also, prudential limitations require 
that the plaintiffs assert their own legal rights and interests, and 
not rest their claims to relief on the rights or interests of third 
parties." Another prudential requirement of standing is that the 
statutory or constitutional provision upon which plaintiffs' claims 
are based must be understood to grant persons in plaintiffs' posi- 
tions a right to relief.s0 
In the instant case, Congress had not expressly given the 
Attorney General standing; therefore, both constitutional and 
prudential standing rules were applicable. By claiming particu- 
larized injury of the type warranting judicial relief, the govern- 
ment in the instant case might have asserted that three separate 
interests were substantial enough to give the Attorney General 
standing. These interests are briefly evaluated below. 
1. Federal legislation 
The existence of federal appropriations and legislation to 
benefit the mentally retarded arguably demonstrates that the 
government has a sufficient interest in enforcing the rights of the 
mentally retarded to give the Attorney General standing to bring 
suit. Standing, however, is not achieved by an intense concern, 
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
56. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Accord, Sierra Club v. Mor- 
ton, 405 U.S. 727,731-32 (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,423-24 (1969); Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 US.  186, 204 (1962). 
57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975). 
58. Id. at 499; see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208, 226-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974); Ex parte 
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam). 
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 
255-56 (1953); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44,46 (1943). See also United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960). 
60. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
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but only by a personal stake in the outcome of litigation such as 
will guarantee sufficient adversity to create a "case or contro- 
versy" between the parties?' 
By acting for the benefit of the mentally retarded, Congress 
has indeed shown a concern for the problems of a disadvantaged 
minority. It is difficult, however, to imagine that this interest is 
a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to assure "concrete 
adverseness." Any harm to the United States that might arise 
from such a general interest could scarcely be termed a 
"particularized injury." Moreover, one would be hard put to dis- 
cover any aspect of life that has not received the attention of 
legislation and that would be immune from government suit 
should interest measured merely by congressional "concern" be 
deemed to satisfy standing  requirement^.'^ 
2. Integrity of funding programs 
Since the Maryland state hospital involved in the instant 
case has received a substantial amount of funds from government 
coffers," the federal government arguably has standing to ensure 
61. Note 54 supra. 
62. In the instant case, even if the United States could show some "threatened or 
actual injury" to itself, the Attorney General could not sue to protect the constitutional 
rights of the institutionalized because of the doctrine of jus tertii. "One may not claim 
standing . . . to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
One legal writer has noted the following: 
In those cases permitting the assertion of constitutional jus tertii, the Court 
has noted the presence of a variety of factors that allegedly justified a departure 
from its articulated rule. Three considerations . . . seem to recur: first, the 
presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant and the third 
parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders' asserting their own consti- 
tutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third parties' constitu- 
tional rights that would result were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted. 
Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423,425 (1975). The 
present case does not qualify under any of the three above-stated exceptions. 
63. On appeal one of the litigants noted: 
Submissions to the district court reflect that Rosewood has received over 13 
million dollars over the last three years . . . through the Medicaid program. 
Statutes provide that funds such as this may be expended if the primary pur- 
pose of the institution in question is "to provide health or rehabilitative serv- 
ices," it meets standards "prescribed by the Secretary [of Health, Education 
and Welfare]" and the individuals for whom payment is sought are "receiving 
active treatment." 42 U.S.C. 9 1396d(d). 
Brief for The United States at 26, United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 
1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1976). 
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has established standards for 
"intermediate care facilities." 45 C.F.R. § 249.12 (1976). The effect of these regulations 
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that no constitutional rights are violated in the administration of 
the funded programs. In some cases the Attorney General has 
been deemed to have standing to enforce the conditions of federal 
grants.64 In such cases, however, the government was not suing 
under the fourteenth amendment but rather under contract 
theory or statute. Undeniably the government could cut off funds 
or sue under a contract theory if conditions of federal grants were 
~iolated. '~ The Attorney General did not proceed under such a 
theory in the instant case, but instead sued under the fourteenth 
amendment? To allow the Attorney General broad powers of 
enforcement under the fourteenth amendment because of the 
government's interest in its funding programs would effectively 
destroy all limitations on government suits; it is difficult to find 
state programs that have not had the benefit of some federal 
dollars. 
Furthermore, the government often seeks to further its poli- 
cies by attaching conditions to federal grants. Such funding pro- 
grams can readily be protected by cutting off funds to organiza- 
tions that refuse or fail to comply with the conditions of the 
grants. Giving the government a broad power to sue under the 
fourteenth amendment because it attached conditions to the re- 
ceipt of federal funds, however, would in effect allow the federal 
government to purchase an otherwise unavailable right to sue. 
In sum, the government's interest in its funding programs 
might provide a "stake in the outcome" sufficient to satisfy con- 
stitutional standing to sue under some legal theories. But such an 
interest, in the absence of statutory authorization, does not give 
the United States standing to vindicate the constitutional rights 
of individuals under the fourteenth amendment!' 
- -- 
and of 42 U.S.C. 4 1396d(d) (Supp. V 1975) cited above is not an appropriate subject for 
decision in the instant case. It may be that the Attorney General could establish standing 
to sue under these regulations to enforce conditions attached to Medicaid funds received 
by the hospital. The Attorney General in the instant case, however, sued under the 
fourteenth amendment; therefore, whether he would have standing to sue under the regu- 
lations and statutes is not relevant to this case. 
64. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See United States 
v. Shanks, 384 F.2d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 1967); Griffin v. United States, 168 F.2d 457,459 
(8th Cir. 1948); United States v. Fitzgerald, 201 F. 295,296 (8th Cir. 1912); see also McGee 
v. Mathis, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143, 155 (1866); United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 
485, 491 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970). 
65. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
66. 419 F. Supp. at 361. 
67. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. 
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3. Parens patriae 
In Solomon the government claimed an interest in remedying 
widespread deprivations of constitutional rights? Under this 
theory the government would be acting as a sort of parens patriae. 
Such a theory, although available to state governments in certain 
 situation^,^^ has not frequently been applied to the federal govern- 
ment .70 
Even if the federal government could make general use of the 
parens patriae doctrine in the instant case, the government would 
not meet the three requirements of the doctrine. First, the parens 
patriae must assert a minimal proprietary interest of its 
The Attorney General in the instant case might be able to satisfy 
this requirement by asserting the interest of the United States in 
federal funds allegedly misused by the defendants. Second, the 
threatened injury must affect a "considerable portion" of the 
country's citizens.72 Here, the federal government would not be 
able to satisfy the requirement. The 1600 persons confined at the 
Maryland institution clearly are not a "considerable portion" of 
the nation's citizenry. And third, suit by the parens patriae can- 
not be for the benefit of particular  individual^.^^ The Attorney 
General's action for particular institutionalized individuals in the 
instant case prevents the fulfillment of this requirement as well. 
Thus, it is apparent that the Attorney General has no grounds to 
sue under parens patriae theory in addition to being unable to 
satisfy other standing criteria. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although some courts would happily have entangled them- 
selves in the emotional issues concerning the rights of the men- 
68. 419 F. Supp. a t  361. 
69. See note 68 supra and notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra. See also Georgia 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U S .  439, 450 (1945); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U S .  
553 (1923); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US.  230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 
U S .  208 (1901). 
70. At times it  may seem that the federal government acts as parens patriae in 
protecting the rights of individuals, e.g., when the government sues under 42 U.S.C. # 
2000c (1970) to enforce school desegregation. Such a suit, however, is specifically author- 
ized by statute and does not rely on a parens patriae theory to satisfy standing require- 
ments. 
71. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U S .  230, 237 (1907); 17 WAYNE L. REV. 
1287, 1299 (1971). 
72. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 US.  125,142 (1902); 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1287,1299 (1971). 
73. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U S .  387,393-94 (1938); 17 WAYNE L. REV. 
1287, 1299 (1971). 
492 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
tally retarded, the court in the instant case carefully refused to 
view this case as deciding anything about the rights of the institu- 
t i~na l i zed .~~  Although the decision may affect the rights of the 
instituti~nalized,'~ the court's approach reaches a result that 
would not create a dangerous precedent for allowing the Attorney 
General nonstatutory authority to sue under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Granting the Attorney General standing in the instant case 
would leave very few limitations on the Attorney General's power 
to sue. In response to a query by Congress as to the result of giving 
the Attorney General power to sue under the fourteenth amend- 
ment, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said that such a pro- 
vision would enable the Department of Justice to initiate or inter- 
vene in suits concerning 
[sltate criminal proceedings or in book or movie censorship; 
disputes involving church-state relations; economic questions 
such as allegedly confiscatory ratemaking or the constitutional 
requirement of just compensation in land acquisition cases; the 
propriety of incarceration in a mental hospital; searches and 
seizures; and controversies involving freedom of worship, or 
speech, or of the press.76 
In effect, to allow the Attorney General a general power to sue 
under the fourteenth amendment would allow him to step into 
the shoes of any private citizen and become the self-appointed 
protector of all private rights in order that remote government 
interests be protected. By dismissing the Attorney General's 
claim in the instant case the court avoided establishing a preced- 
ent that could have been misused to allow executive interference 
in disputes involving private rights. Although allowing the Attor- 
ney General to sue when state actions deprive the developmen- 
tally disabled of their constitutional rights would be one means 
of protecting those rights, such power should be given, if a t  all, 
by Congress to insure that the rule and its limitations can be 
carefully prescribed. The significance of the instant case is the 
attempt by the court to limit a power dangerous not necessarily 
in its present use, but in its ~otentiali t ies.~~ 
74. 419 F. Supp. at 361. 
75. The decision at least effects a delay as to when the institutionalized may enjoy 
their rights, if in fact they are deprived, i.e., until Congress can act (assuming it chooses 
to grant statutory authority to the Attorney General to sue). 
76. H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in [I9641 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 2391, 2450. 
77. Note, Growing Executive Power and the Constitution, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 
117 (1952). 
